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Tax caps may have had
a more limiting effect on
property tax levies than
was intended.

Tax caps may have an
even more negative effect
on property tax revenues
during times of recovery
from a recession.

While tax caps protect
against tax increases in
good economic times, they
make it more likely that the
tax burden on homes and
businesses will increase
when times are bad.

Tax caps do not protect
against rapid increases
in the property tax rates
when property values are
declining.

While new property
development helps mitigate
the negative effects of tax
caps, it does not eliminate
those effects.
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issue: Tax Caps on Illinois Local Governments:
How Well Are They Working?
by Roger K. Dahlstrom

Editor’s Note: This is the first in a planned series of Policy Profiles that will analyze the
fiscal impacts of tax caps for Illinois local governments. Using a school district as an
example, this Profiles provides an assessment of the impact that tax caps have had in their
first 19 years (1991 to 2009) and suggests how they are likely to affect local government
operations as the nation’s economy recovers from the current recession.

Caps on local government property taxes, used by many Illinois local governments, have
limited those governments’ ability to raise additional tax revenues through higher property
taxes levies. During the period of economic growth in the decades just before and after the
turn of the century, local governments appear to have adjusted to tax caps and maintained
service levels.
Now, however, economic conditions are much less favorable to local government use of
property taxes: economic growth has stalled, property values have been declining and
federal and state governments are facing fiscal crises of their own. With money to support
local government services withering, reliance on property taxes is likely to increase.
What effect tax caps will have on local governments’ ability to maintain services in bad
economic times is unknown.
This Policy Profiles describes how one Illinois local government – Kaneland Community
Unit School District #302 (District #302) – has been affected by tax caps since 1992,
and offers predictions, based on analytical models, of the effect tax caps may have on the
District’s ability to sustain its educational services in the years just ahead as the economy
struggles to regain its growth momentum.
Among other findings, the results of this study suggest that:
•
Tax caps may have had a much more limiting effect on local government property
tax revenues than was intended, and
•
Tax caps may have an even more negative effect on property tax revenues during
times of recovery from economic recession.
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How do tax caps work?
The Illinois legislature passed the Property
Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL)
in 1991 in response to what some
characterized as “skyrocketing property
taxes” in the Chicago metropolitan area’s
so-called collar counties.
Commonly labeled “tax caps,” these
limitations on property tax levies went into
effect for most local governmental bodies
in Chicago’s five collar counties in 1992.
Cook County’s suburban governments were
placed under tax caps beginning in the 1995
tax levy year and, in 1996, county boards
in all Illinois counties were authorized to
allow voters in each county in the state
to decide, by referendum, if the PTELL
limits should be applied to their county’s
local governments. A list of the 39 counties
that currently utilize tax caps is provided
in Table 1.
Under PTELL, tax caps limit the amount
of revenue any local government can raise
from property taxes on a year-by-year basis
to five per cent or the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), whichever is less.1 By law, the tax cap
limitations apply to the amount of increase
in tax revenue that can be collected, and not
to the tax levy rate itself.
The underlying presumption behind tax
caps was that real estate values would
increase steadily year after year and, indeed,
that presumption had been generally
accurate since the end of World War II.
However, the PTELL legislation did not
anticipate the sharp drop in property values
that has occurred since the onset of the
recession in 2007.
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Table 1: Counties with Tax Caps on Non-Home Rule Local Governments
Counties in Metropolitan Areas
Boone
DuPage
Champaign
Kane
Cook
Kankakee
DeKalb

Kendall
Lake
McHenry

Sangamon
Will
Winnebago

Counties in Rural Areas
Christian
Jo Daviess
Coles
Lee
Cumberland
Livingston
Franklin
Logan
Greene
Macoupin
Jackson
Marion
Jefferson
Massac

McDonough
Menard
Monroe
Morgan
Randolph
Schuyler

Shelby
Stephenson
Tazewell
Union
Washington
Williamson

But the sharp drop did occur, and early
evidence suggests that the PTELL tax cap
limitations might adversely affect the long
term revenue raising capability of local
governments, particularly during and after
economic recessions. The remainder of this
Profiles draws upon the experience of the
Kaneland School District to demonstrate
how this could occur.2
Why was the Kaneland School District
chosen?
While each school district is unique,
Kaneland Community Unit School
District #302 is reasonably typical of
Chicago suburban districts that have been
experiencing substantial development
pressures. Located in western Kane County
with a small slice of land in far eastern
DeKalb County, the District historically
has been a rural school district with a low
population density even though it contained
several municipalities: Elburn, Kaneville,

Maple Park, Montgomery, North Aurora,
Sugar Grove, Virgil, and part of Aurora.
However, in the decades just past, these
municipalities have experienced significant
urban growth and development.
District #302 is thus reasonably typical of
school districts in the developing suburban
fringe of Metropolitan Chicago. While the
majority of its land is still agricultural, the
number of students served by the District
increased approximately 123 per cent
between 1993 and 2009, and the rate of
enrollment growth accelerated during the
later years of the period (see Graph 3 on
page 4). In fact, the rate of enrollment
growth continued to increase even after
2000 when the capped tax rate started to
fall.
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It is likely that District #302 will continue
to experience significant residential growth
during the course of the next 10 to 20 years
notwithstanding the recent downturn in
land development activity.
Depending on one’s point of view, the
District has experienced the best, or the
worst, of PTELL’s consequences for local
governments.
What happened to District #302 in
PTELL’s first 19 years?
The impact of PTELL on District #302
was mixed. The equalized assessed value
(EAV) of taxable real estate in the District
increased sharply during these years. The
EAV of existing property increased an
average of 6.1 per cent a year, but new
property development in the District
increased at an average annual rate of 11.6
per cent over the same period of time.
Despite the tax caps imposed in 1991,
which limited the annual increase in
property tax revenues to the 2.6 per cent
average increase in the consumer price
index (CPI), the actual property tax
collections in the District increased at
an average annual rate of 10 per cent. In
part, that was due to successful referenda
passed by District voters in 1996 and again
in 2005 to increase the maximum school
tax levy authorized by law for the District,
but a significant amount of the increase
was a result of the 11.6 per cent average
annual increase in new property added to
the tax rolls.
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tax levies, the District’s capped property
tax rate drifted downward during the years
not affected by referendum tax increases.3
So why might tax caps pose a problem
for public schools?
Despite the encouraging information
provided above, tax caps pose both an
immediate and a long term threat to public
education. Continuing to use District #302
as an example, those problems are primarily
the result of three factors:
First, there appears to be a limit to the
extent to which the development of new
property offsets the tax limits imposed by
tax caps. As Graph 1 indicates, the addition
of new property and the increase in the
District’s total tax levy moved in concert
between 1992 and 2001, but a significant
divergence began in 2002 and continues

to the present. At first, that divergence was
positive, permitting the District’s total tax
levy to increase at a rate commensurate with
the growing need for educational services.
But, starting in 2001, the rate of increase
in new property to the tax base no longer
provided a commensurate increase in the
total amount of taxes that could be levied
under the tax capped system.4
Then, with the onset of the national
recession in 2007, conditions turned
ominous as tax extensions continued to
climb to meet increasing school costs
even when the addition of new property
dropped precipitously. This emerging trend
suggests severe school funding problems
could surface in the very near future.

Graph 1: Kaneland CUSD #302 New Property Tax Extension Trends

Source: Kaneland CUSD #302

An unanticipated consequence of the 11.6
per cent average annual increase from new
property development in the district was
that, to comply with the PTELL limits on
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Graph 2: Kaneland CUSD #302 EAV/Tax Extension Trends

Source: Kaneland CUSD #302

Rate of Change Over Time

Graph 3: Kaneland CUSD #302 Enrollment/Capped Tax Rate Trends

Source: Kaneland CUSD #302

That possibility is supported by Graph 2
which shows that, as the rate at which new
property is added to the tax base declines,
the rate of growth in equalized assessed
valuation also levels off – and might even
decline – but the pressure on school costs
will likely continue to increase.
Second, as Graph 3 suggests, it is not at
all clear that the tax extension limitation
will permit tax rates to rise sufficiently to
meet increasing educational costs. The
enrollment curve in Graph 3 is consistent
with past patterns of increasing educational
service costs, especially in areas where
new development has been primarily
residential. Graph 2 and Graph 3 suggest
that enrollment trends continue to rise
even though new development falls off.
More recent data points indicate that the

capped extension may be falling behind
service demands (i.e., may not be producing
enough tax revenue to maintain education
services at their present level).
Third, changes in public service costs are
not accurately, or even adequately, reflected
by changes in the consumer price index.
This is particularly true for education costs.
The labor intensive nature of education and
the public’s traditional expectation that the
public schools must continually improve
can combine to drive education costs up
at a faster rate than the general increase in
the cost of living. In this situation, which is
highly likely in the next few years, school
tax increases limited by changes in the cost
of living index may not enable the schools
to levy enough taxes to maintain current
levels of education programming.
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That is illustrated for District #302 in
Graph 4. It shows a widening divergence
between the CPI and education costs even
though, in the 1991-2009 period, District
#302 policies regarding student to teacher
ratios, average class sizes, and the number
and nature of extra-curricular activities did
not significantly change.
What, then, has been District #302’s
experience with tax caps?
The District’s effectiveness in garnering
support for proposed referenda, when
combined with EAV increases due
primarily to new property development,
have helped District #302 maintain its level
of services despite the existence of the tax
caps. The District’s experience does suggest
that, while new property development helps
mitigate the negative effects of tax caps, it
does not eliminate those effects.
What does this imply about the use of
tax caps?
This question has two parts. The first
addresses the net impact that tax caps have
had so far. The second speaks to the impact
they are likely to have in the foreseeable
future. The answer to both questions must
be informed by a detailed analysis of past
data.
To provide tentative answers to these
questions, an analytic model, using District
#302 as an example, was designed to
predict how the tax caps:
•

Have affected District #302.
This requires controlling for
different variables to isolate more
clearly the net effect of the tax caps
in the economic climate of the past
19 years.

•

Will affect District #302 in the
future, based upon an analysis of
different forecasts of what the future
might look like in the decade ahead.
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Trend - Per Cent Change

Graph 4: Kaneland CUSD #302 Operating Budget and CPI Trends

Source: Kaneland CUSD #302; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Graph 5: Kaneland CUSD #302 Operating Budget and CPI Trends

Without tax caps, the projected increase in
school taxes, with the tax rate held steady,
was only 3.4 per cent ($11.8 million or
$590,000 per year) larger than the school
tax increase actually experienced (capped
tax rate plus two referenda increases)
over the 19 year period. Thus, in terms of
school revenue in a period of rapid property
development, increasing property values,
and resident commitment to maintaining
educational quality, the tax caps appear to
have had limited effect.
Graph 5 presents a modeled projection
illustrating the relative effects of different
conditions. It compares the level of
revenues that would have existed without
tax caps (unconstrained), the level of
revenues that would have come with tax
caps but without new property (capped
w/o new), and the level of revenues that
would result with new property under the
tax caps (capped w/new).
The graph suggests that, isolated from
other considerations such as successful
referenda, tax caps could have had a
substantial effect in limiting annual school
revenues in District #302.

Source: Kaneland CUSD #302

One such detailed analysis of the way tax
caps affected District #302 is described
in the report, Tax Caps Implications for
Alternative Development Environments,
published by the Northern Illinois
University, Center for Governmental
Studies (see endnote 2). The remainder
of this Policy Profiles will summarize the
findings presented in that analysis.

5

How did the tax caps affect District
#302 schools?
One answer to this question can be made
by comparing District #302’s actual tax
revenues during the tax capped years 1991
to 2009 to a projection of what the District’s
tax revenues might have been if the tax caps
had not been put into place. This analysis
assumes that the District #302 tax rate had
been held constant during those years, an
assumption that is consistent with past
policies of the District’s School Board. It
also disregards the impact of the two tax
referenda passed by District voters in 1996
and 2005.

What is the likely future impact of tax
caps on District #302?
Had the trends experienced during 20002009 remained consistent, the downward
pressure on tax rates would have likely
continued. School tax levies, under those
conditions, would have increased between
an estimated $36.7 million (2009) and
$55.2 million (2020).

6

Center for Governmental Studies

policyprofiles

The assumption that those trends would
continue on roughly the same trajectory,
however, was clearly not the case. The
impact of the economic recession, which
started in 2007 and plummeted downward
in 2008 with the housing and banking
crises, was just beginning to be felt by
school districts in 2009. But the change
in economic conditions did occur, and
so trend lines were redrawn to predict
how economic decline might affect local
government finances when revenue growth
was limited by the 1991 tax caps.5
As expected, the deteriorating economy
caused a decline both in the amount of new
development and in the assessed value of
existing taxable property within District
#302’s boundaries. Just as new economic
development and rising property values
caused a decline in the actual tax rate
allowed under the tax cap system, so, too,
does a fall-off in new development and
falling property values cause an increase
in the tax rate to fund the cost of public
education. (It should be noted here that
some local government costs, such as
education and public safety, often continue
to increase on a per-unit basis even during
periods of economic decline when tax
revenues are falling.)
However, the tax rate increases allowed
under the tax caps would not be sufficient
to offset the negative effects of overall
property valuation decreases, and so the
total projected property taxes that could
be levied by District #302 over the period
2010-2020 would, under the scenario’s
assumptions, decline from an estimated
$505.4 million without tax caps to an
estimated $486.8 million with the caps.
What this suggests is that, in times of
declining property values, the tax cap
system could constrain school districts –

and other tax capped local governments –
from levying enough tax revenues to cover
their increasing service costs. It could mean
that schools and other governments might
have to cut spending even while raising the
maximum amount of tax revenues allowed
by the tax caps.6
What is the projected future impact of
tax caps?
The rationale behind the tax cap law was
that it would limit the taxes that could
be collected when property values were
increasing. (As explained earlier, tax cap
limitations apply to the amount of increase
in tax revenue that can be collected, not to
the tax levy rate.)
Now that property values have fallen,
however, unanticipated consequences have
appeared. The tax cap laws still permit an
annual increase in the amount of tax levied
and collected, and the projections made
in the study indicate that increasing tax
collections after property values have fallen
triggers a rapid increase in the property
tax rates.
District #302’s experience is instructive.
During the first 19 years of rapid growth
and development, the tax rate fell from
0.042863 to 0.040899, a decline of 18.6
per cent. After just three years of declines
in property values and new development,
District #302’s tax rate:
•

Increased aggressively to 0.048050,
a rate increase of 17.5 per cent in
just three years, or a rate that was
12 per cent higher than the pre-tax
cap rate;

•

Under certain conditions, could
continue increasing through 2020,
to a rate of 0.048283. That rate

Northern Illinois University

would be 12.6 per cent higher
than the 1991 pre-tax cap rate and
18.1 per cent higher than the 2007
rate that was levied just before the
onset of the recession. Such
increases are all allowed by law.
In short, declining property values drive the
tax rate up very quickly, and these increases
can be of a long duration when the tax cap
system is in place.
Adding to the complexity, the increase in
the tax rate appears to be insufficient to
maintain service standards in the District
#302 example. In December of 2010,
District #302 officials released budget
projections prepared by their financial
consultant. Operational deficits were
forecast as follows:
2011:
2012:
2013:
2014:
2015:
2016:

$1.39 million
$1.81 million
$2.99 million
$2.91 million
$2.87 million
$3.41 million

Predictably, budget cuts followed,
eliminating some staff positions and
student programs.
What does this mean for the average
property owner?
When property valuations are dropping,
the tax cap law allows – and, indeed,
essentially requires – local governments
to raise taxes if such essential services as
education, public safety, and health care,
are to be maintained. While the tax cap
law does provide property owners some
protection against tax increases in good
times, they may make it more likely that
the tax burden on individual homes and
businesses will increase, on a relative basis,
when the economy is bad.
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Endnotes
1

A detailed description of Illinois’ tax caps, together with a discussion of the pros and cons
of the tax cap system, can be found in the May, 1999, edition of Policy Profiles (niucgs.
org/portfolio/policy_profiles/pdf/policy_5-99.pdf)
2

The charts and data presented in this issue are taken from the report, Tax Caps Implications
for Alternative Development Environments, Center for Governmental Studies, Northern
Illinois University, 2010. A copy of the report can be found on the web at niucgs.org.
Data on Kaneland Community School District #302 is taken from District files and
reports. Additional data in Graph 5 is taken from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Statistics (CPI).

3

It is not clear to what extent, if any, the lower tax rates benefitted individual homeowners,
since the reduction in their rates would have been offset to some degree by higher assessed
valuations on their homes. Future research will attempt to determine how individual
taxpayers were affected by the imposition of the tax cap limitations.
4

An increase in the tax extension is an increase in the size of the tax base. Detailed research
based on modeling suggests that there is a limit to the positive effect new property can
exert on the capped tax extension.

5

The assumptions on which future changes were predicted were formulated in 2010. In
retrospect, the assumptions may have understated the depth and length of the economic
malaise, but any such miscalculation would have understated the severity of the negative
impact of tax caps on school district (and other tax capped local government) revenues
in time of recession.

6

In all of these projections, the rate of increase in education costs was projected to be
about the same as it had been. Based on past experience with education costs in recessions,
these increases were to be expected and did, in fact, occur since actual cost increases were
known for the early years of the recession when the projections were developed.
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